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ARTICLE 2B AS LEGAL SOFTWARE FOR
ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING-OPERATING
SYSTEM OR TROJAN HORSE?
By A. Michael Froomkin t
ABSTRACT
The proposed draft of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code
can be thought of as akin to a complex computer software suite which
seeks to dominate a market by offering all things to all people. The
author suggests, however, that Article 2B's electronic contracting rules
interoperate poorly with existing digital signature laws, and with some
forms of electronic commerce. The author also questions whether Article
2B is the proper means to enact controversial rules that ordinarily would
make consumers liable for fraudulent uses of their digital signatures by
third parties. After considering Article 2B's potential interaction with
existing digital signature laws, state consumer laws and liability rules,
and the practices of Certificate Authorities, the author suggests that Arti-
cle 2B still contains several bugs in its code and is therefore still not
ready for adoption.
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Online commerce is no longer a prediction; it is an economically sig-
nificant reality,' so significant that online sales may well become the pre-
dominant means of selling consumer goods. Online distribution may also
someday become the primary means of distributing software and other in-
formation. So far, online contracting generally has proceeded with sur-
prisingly few legal crashes. Nevertheless, law reformers across the world
are rolling out model laws to conform to what appear to be the new reali-
ties of Internet-based trade, and to facilitate the use of new technologies
such as digital signatures. Proposed Uniform Commercial Code Article
2B-Licenses2 now joins this bandwagon. In its desire to create a com-
plete legal regime for the regulation of transactions in licenses for infor-
mation products, and in particular software and databases, Article 2B pro-
poses several provisions relating to the online purchase and delivery of
information and other products.
Like software vendors, legal reformers have different styles. Some at-
tempt to create sleek, narrowly targeted products that meet a single, some-
times modest, need. Others have a more ambitious agenda, and attempt to
create the legal equivalent of the software suite: wholesale legal reforms
that provide a solution to every imaginable legal problem. And if legal re-
formers are software vendors, then legislators are the institutional buyers
of their products. Some jurisdictions seek out the newest and latest legal
devices; others prefer to hang back and wait for version 2, or even 3.x, or
'99, when maybe the worst bugs will have been ironed out.3 Moreover,
like large corporate buyers, legislators have widely varying understand-
1. See generally UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING
DIGITAL ECONOMY (1998), available at <http://www.ecommerce.gov/emerging.htm>.
2. U.C.C. Article 2B-Licenses (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft), available at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/2b898.htm>. The Microsoft Word version
of the August draft, available on the web site maintained by the University of Pennsylva-
nia repository of U.C.C. drafts, contains redline and strikeout marks that show changes
from the previous draft. To track changes from the April to the August draft one must
acquire each of the intervening drafts available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/
ulc/ulc.htm#ucc2b>.
3. At the Berkeley symposium I learned that the Article 2B as software metaphor
used in this paper, which grew out of a conversation with my colleague Patrick Gudridge,
has been used by others, notably Cern Kaner. See, e.g., Cem Kaner, Bad Software--Who
is Liable?, Address at the Proceedings of the American Society for Quality's 52nd An-
nual Quality Congress (May 1998), available at <http://www.badsoftware.com/
asqcirc.htm>; Cem Kaner, Brian Lawrence & Bob Johnson, SPLAT! Requirements Bugs
on the Information Superhighway, 5 Software QA 18 (1997).
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ings of the information products they are considering acquiring, and have
different capacities to undertake whatever customization may be necessary
to adapt a generic product to their environment. As a result of this diver-
sity, current laws relating to online contracting and especially digital sig-
natures are something of a patchwork, but they are evolving quickly. ,
As regards electronic commerce ("e-commerce") at least, Article 2B is
also evolving rapidly. For example, in the five months between the March,
1998 draft,4 (which was current when most contributions to this sympo-
sium first were being drafted) and the August 1, 1998 draft, provisions re-
garding e-commerce have been materially altered, and in one critical case
completely reversed.5 Substantial changes have appeared since the April 1,
1998 draft-which the drafters said was all but final. Subsequent changes
resulting in versions dated July 19986 and August 1998 testify to the hard
work of the drafters and to their attempts, perhaps not always successful,
to respond to critics. No good deed goes unpunished, however, and when
faced with so many continuous changes in a long and complex document,
one is entitled-even required-to ask whether the code is stable and
whether one can rely on it.
7
4. U.C.C. Article 2B-Licenses (Mar. 1998 Draft), available at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/2b398.htm>.
5. Compare U.C.C. § 2B-104(c) (Apr. 15, 1998 Draft) ("A statute authorizing
electronic or digital signatures in effect on the effective date of this article is not affected
by this article"), available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/2b498.htm>,
with U.C.C. § 2B-104(c) (Mar. 1998 Draft), available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/
library/ulc/ucc2/2b398.htm> ("A statute authorizing electronic or digital signatures in
effect on the effective date of this article is not affected by this article, but in the case of a
conflict this article controls.") (emphasis added). See also infra text accompanying note
40.
6. The July draft, which was prepared for the July 1998 meeting of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, can be found at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2b/ucc2bamg.htm>.
7. It should not need to be said, but it also follows from the rapid rate of change in
a complex document that arguments in favor of Article 2B based on some form of notice
and estoppel ("we discussed this issue two years ago-where were you?") deserve to be
treated with derision. Alas, some of Article 2B's more exuberant proponents continue to
make such arguments. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Business Software Alliance et al.
on Article 2B (July 15, 1988) ("One would expect ALl motions and votes to be circum-
spect and to give credence to the open forum of NCCUSL and the endless hours of dis-
cussion heard and considered by the Article 2B Drafting Committee. But they do not.
[One] motion on standard form contracts seeks to overturn the delicate compromise
reached by the Drafting Committee after untold hours of debate and consideration of al-
ternative approaches. The motions on choice of law and choice of forum also ignore
hours of discussion and compromise, as well as commercial realities and needs. We do
1998] 1025
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One reason why Article 2B has proven to be so difficult to get right is
that the information technologies to which it would apply are themselves
in a state of ferment. As many papers in this Symposium demonstrate, the
task of defining licensing rules for information is difficult enough; adding
in the task of defining distinct rules applicable to all electronic contracts of
sale, or even just those electronic contracts licensing information, may
make it impossible. But while information licensing agreements may pres-
ent special legal issues and problems that require a particularized legal re-
gime, it does not follow that they require their own electronic contracting
regime as well-unless there is something special about the electronic sale
of information licenses, or about information itself that distinguishes the
formation and enforcement of online sales agreements from contracts re-
lating to other online sales. Whether or not the case for distinct rules re-
lating to information licenses has been proved, the case for distinct rules
relating to the electronic sale of information has not been made.
Indeed, to the extent that Article 2B creates unique electronic con-
tracting rules, the introduction of special rules in Article 2B threatens to
create confusion rather than standardization. When transactions are
"mixed," combining information licenses with more traditional goods, the
confusion may become more pronounced if inconsistent rules apply to dif-
ferent parts of the same transaction, or because the dominance of one set
of rules provides unexpected outcomes. In any case, the over-ambitious
reach of Article 2B seems certain to have unwanted and no doubt unin-
tended consequences for e-commerce.
Although the electronic contracting provisions in Article 2B raise a
host of interesting and complex issues, this Comment will give dispropor-
tionate emphasis to Article 2B's potentially awkward interaction with so-
called digital signature laws, and with rules relating to Certification
Authorities. Article 2B itself seeks to be technology neutral, and thus its e-
commerce provisions apply more broadly than this Comment's focus on
digital signatures might suggest.8 Nevertheless, I chose to focus primarily
on digital signatures because they are currently the most widely recog-
nized method of electronic authentication, and are increasingly widely de-
ployed. In addition, the profusion of laws and proposals relating to digital
signatures at the state, federal, and international level means that, for this
type of e-commerce at least, Article 2B does not enjoy the luxury of writ-
ing on a blank slate.
not support this type of above-the-fray tinkering, particularly on such fundamental is-
sues."), available at <http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/amemo98I .html>.
. 8. For instance, Article 2B also has innovative features regarding automated con-
tracts formed by electronic agents, some of which are discussed in section lI.D.
1026 [Vol. 13:1023
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The diversity of existing and proposed approaches increases the case
for standardization across jurisdictions. On the other hand, an evaluation
of the standardization Article 2B offers must also take account of the pol-
icy choices embedded in the standard, and the extent to which it either af-
fects other types of e-commerce or it risks creating dual and perhaps con-
flicting rules for electronic contracting depending on the subject matter of
the transaction. Like the makers of a new operating system or a complex
software suite, the proponents of a wide-ranging legal reform must con-
tend with legacy applications and with the habits they have engendered.
Despite some improvements in its most recent revisions, and even dis-
counting for the relative newness of digital signature-based commerce and
the laws that seek to enable it, there is ample reason to doubt that Article
2B is compatible with the emerging model of digital signature-based e-
commerce.
I. BACKGROUND: DIGITAL SIGNATURES, CERTIFICATE
AUTHORITIES AND THE EMERGING LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A digital signature is a mathematically generated, probabilistically
unique, data string that can be associated with digitized information in or-
der to demonstrate the authenticity of that information and the identity of
the signer. A digital signature created with Alice's private key 9 links her to
the data and can be used to prove that the data has not been altered since
Alice signed it. 10 Anyone who has Alice's public key corresponding to the
private key she used to generate the signature, and the right software, can
then verify" the integrity of Alice's signature. Because the signature algo-
9. For a fuller explanation of public-private key technology see A. Michael
Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR.
L. REV. 49, 50-53.(1996), available at <http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/
trusted.htm>.
10. When combined with a digital time stamp the message can also be proved to
have been sent at a certain time. See id. at 65-67.
11. Article 2B does not use the term "verify" in the context of electronic contract-
ing: The term is used in the ABA Digital Signature Guidelines and in the Utah Digital
Signature Act: "Verify a digital signature" means, in relation to a given digital signature,
message, and public, key, to determine accurately that: (a) the digital signature was cre-
ated by the private key corresponding to the public key; and (b) the message has not been
altered since its digital signature was created. See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES
§ 1.37 (1996), available at <http:l/www.abanet.org/scitechlec/isc/dsgfree.html>; Utah
Digital Signature Act § 103(37), UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 46, ch. 3 (1995). Instead, Article
2B uses the term "authenticate" which refers to both the act of creating the original digi-
tal signature and the act of confirming its authenticity and validity. See U.C.C. § 2B-
102(a)(3) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft). Conflating the two significantly different actions into one
term creates a real, and avoidable, potential for confusion.
1027
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rithm uses the entire original digitized information as input, if the infor-
mation is altered in even the slightest way, the signature will not decrypt
properly, thus showing that the message was altered in transit or that the
signature was forged by copying it from a different message.' 2 A digital
signature copied from one message has an infinitesimal chance of success-
fully authenticating any other message.'
3
A digital signature cannot work well in isolation. In most arms-length
uses where the parties have no other means of confirming their identity
and the security of their signatures, and especially those involving the
transfer of value, a digital signature requires a certificate issued by some-
one other than the parties to back it up. If Alice e-mails Bob a program
that she has authenticated with a digital signature, the presence of the
digital signature alone adds little. Bob needs a copy of the public key that
corresponds to Alice's private key-to check the validity of the signature.
More importantly, Bob needs a way to confirm that the corresponding
public key is actually Alice's and not an imposter's. Current practice-
which may be about to change14 -further assumes that before relying on
Alice's digital signature, Bob usually needs to confirm that Alice's key is
still valid, since keys are sometimes revoked before their natural expiry
date due to key compromise or for other reasons.
In order to rely on the authenticity of Alice's public key, therefore,
Bob needs to get the key, or data authenticating the key, from some source
. 12. Digital signatures achieve this by computing a one-way hash value.of the mes-
sage and then encrypting the hash value with the user's private key. A hash function takes
an input string and converts it to a fixed-size, and usually smaller, output string. A one-
way hash function adds the property that while it is easy to compute the hash value from
the input it is very hard to find other inputs that produce the same hash output. See
BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 28 (2nd ed. 1996). The recipient checks the
digital signature by decrypting the hash value with the sender's public key, then compar-
ing the hash value with the independently generated hash value of the file received. If the
two numbers are the same, the file is authentic and unchanged. See RSA Laboratories,
Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography § 2.1.6 (visited
Nov. 9, 1998) <http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/newfaq/algtech.htm>.
13. See SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 38 (noting that a digital signature using a 160-
bit hash number has only a one. in 2 .6 chance of mistakenly authenticating another
document).
14. See Ronald L. Rivest, Can We Eliminate Certificate Revocation Lists?, PROC.
OF FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 178 (Rafael Hirschfeld ed., 1988) (proposing and advo-
cating a means of dispensing with certificate revocation lists in which the proponent of a
digital signature bears the burden of providing a suitably recent and reliable certificate to
the relying party), available at <http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/-rivest/revocation.ps>; see also
Richard Hombeck, The Troubling Truth About "Trust" on the Internet, 10 J. ELEC-
TRONIC COMM. 59, 65 (1997) (critiquing CRL model), available at
<http://www.primenet.com/-hombeck/trust.htm>.
(Vol. 13:10231028
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other than the "Alice" sending him the original e-mail message. This is
because if someone is forging a message from Alice, that malicious third
party will send his own public key as well, claiming that it is actually Al-
ice's. This imposture will fail if and only if Bob has access to Alice's real
public key from some outside source, so that when Bob attempts to use
Alice's real public key to verify a message signed with the imposter's pri-
vate key, the verification will fail, revealing the forgery.
There are many ways of providing Bob with the information he needs
to satisfy himself that the public key he will use to verify the authenticity
of Alice's message is both genuine and still valid. One possible outside
source is a business that sells and administers certificates attesting to the
binding between Alice and her public key, and which offers online verifi-
cation services. These businesses are known as Certificate Authorities
("CAs"). An increasing number of enterprises are seeking to establish
themselves as CAs. Firms such as VeriSign offer a variety of CA services
to all comers at a variety of prices and levels of assurance.' 5 Others, such
as the American Bankers Association (which recently announced an
agreement with Zions National Bank in Utah to provide root CA services
for banks), seek to serve specialty markets.16
The growth in the number of CAs, and the increasing interest in digital
signatures as elements of e-commerce, parallels an extraordinary law-
making effort on the part of state, federal, foreign, and international legis-
lative and law reform bodies. Digital signature laws or policies have been
debated, proposed, or adopted by almost every state in the union, 17 most
European nations,18 the EU itself,19 UNCITRAL, 20 non-European na-
15. See VeriSign Home Page (visited Nov. 9, 1998) <http://www.verisign.com>.
16. See ABA Announces Plan to Become Certificate Authority For Financial Serv-
ices Industry (Mar. 6, 1998) <http://www.aba.com/abatool/showmerel.html?location=
PR_030698ec.htm>; OCC Approves A National Bank to Certify Digital Signatures (Jan.
13, 1998) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/98Rellst.htm>.
17. For a continually updated summary of state legislation see McBride, Baker &
Coles, Summary Of Electronic Commerce And Digital Signature Legislation (last modi-
fied Oct. 13, 1998) <http://www.mbc.com/dssum.html>.
18. See generally Juan Avellan, Digital Signature Links, (last modified June 10,
1997) <http://www.qmw.ac.uk/-t16345/#Europe> (Summary of activities in European
countries, including Germany, Italy and the UK.).
19. See generally Towards A European Frameworkfor Digital Signatures And En-
cryption, COM(97)503, available at <http://www.ispo.cec.be/eif/policy/97503toc.html>.
20. See generally Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic Commerce, UNICITRAL,
32nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.73 (1998), available at
<http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/english/sessions/wg ec/wp-73.htm>; UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Commerce, G.A. Res 51, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 85th plen. mtg.,
1029
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tions, 21 and many private bodies including the American Bar Associa-
22 aciiytarelne:asntion. This activity responds to a real need: absent clarifying legislation,
the law relating to CAs' duties and liabilities is likely to be confused and
confusing. 23 Nevertheless, this outpouring of legislative enterprise was not
caused by a barrage of lawsuits resulting from Internet commerce gone
wrong.24 Nor can this activity easily be explained by a massive pent-up
consumer demand for digital signatures that has been held back by legal
uncertainty, as there is only equivocal evidence of pent-up demand, and
indeed only some evidence of demand pure and simple, on the part of con-
sumers. The flurry of legislative activity appears primarily entrepreneurial,
designed not only to facilitate existing demand for e-commerce but also to
nurture new demand and speed the development of the necessary software
tools and social institutions. 25 There is indeed some truth to one commen-
tator's warning that, "[d]igital signature technology may be loved to death
before it ever gets to really take off."
26
Given the limited amount of Internet and other e-commerce that relies
upon digital signatures today, both digital signature-based commerce and
the statutes and rules designed to support it must be viewed as very early
production models. If we are perhaps beyond the point of experiment and
prototype and into the roll-out period, we are still at version 1.027-- and
U.N. Doc. A/51/628 (1996), available at <http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/english/texts/
electcom/mi-ec.htm>.
21. E.g., Japan. See Electronic Commerce Promotion Council of Japan, Certifica-
tion Authority Guidelines (Alpha Version) (Apr. 7, 1997) <http://www.ecom.or.jp/eng/
output/ca/eng-guideline.htm>.
22. See generally DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES (1996), available at
<http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html>.
23. 1 belabor this point in Froomkin, supra note 9.
24. So far as I am aware, there have been none, other than rare cases in which
courts addressed whether an electronic "copy" can have the same legal force and effect as
a traditional written signature in the absence of a "written original." See, e.g., Allen v.
Caldwell, 470 S.E.2d 696, 698 (Ga. App. 1996) (questioning the validity of a "facsimile"
that lacks an "original").
25. It is entirely normal, appropriate, and often praiseworthy for the legislature (and
others) to seek to enact power-conferring laws. See generally H.L.A. HART,. THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 27-33 (1961). The issue is the content of the facilities created for indi-
viduals to realize their wishes, and the structure of the resulting de facto as well as the de
jure structures of rights and duties that will flourish within the coercive framework of the
law.
26. Stewart A. Baker, International Developments Affecting Digital Signatures,
(Oct. 1997) <http://www.steptoe.com/WebDoc.NSF/Law+&+The+Net+AIl/Intema-
tional+Developments+Affecting+Digital+ Signatures? OpenDocument>.
27. In the case of states such as Utah or Minnesota, which have already amended
their original digital signature laws, we may be at version 1.1. The rapidity and frequency
[Vol. 13:10231030
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every software user today knows what that means: like the early adopters
of new software, the consumers and others who participate in the early
days of digital signature-based e-commerce will be only a little more than
uncompensated beta-testers. It is true that many of the legislative efforts
today share common features, and in many cases were drafted by people
who are in close communication. 28 On the other hand, there are also some
sharp differences in approach regarding a number of issues, not least the
allocation of risk and liability, the extent to which CAs or consumers
should be shielded from loss, and the extent to which the relevant rules
should be drafted by legislatures or regulatory authority delegated to ad-
ministrative bodies.2
9
II. ARTICLE 2B ON ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING
While there is a great deal to be said for a uniform national standard
regarding the legal force and effect of digital signatures and the regulation
of CAs, we do not have enough transactional experience today to know
which of the various approaches will be the best, whether we have a stable
technological model,3 or indeed whether any of these approaches already
deployed might have unintended legal or social consequences. Article
2B's approach to e-commerce suffers from numerous problems as applied
to digital signature-based commerce. First, as regards digital signatures,
Article 2B is not uniform: different rules will apply in states with grand-
fathered digital signature laws. Second, whether or not states have pre-
existing digital signature laws, it will sometimes be difficult to figure out
with which digital signature laws are likely to be revised underlines the point that we are
at an early stage in their development.
28. Several institutions enable continual contacts, including committees of the
American Bar Association, the Commissioners on Uniform Laws, the UNCITRAL
drafting process, and an excellent electronic mailing list with more than 150 members
maintained by Professor Amelia Boss at Temple.
29. For an excellent survey of digital signature issues relating to other sections of
the U.C.C., see Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of
Internet Commerce, 72 TULANE L. REV. 1177 (1998). Very valuable, more narrowly fo-
cused, treatments of various issues relating to digital signatures and online sales or to
digital signatures and specific articles of the U.C.C. include C. Bradford Biddle, Legis-
lating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws and the Electronic Commerce Market-
place, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1225 (1997); C. Bradford Biddle, Misplaced Priorities: the
Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1143 (1996); Walter A. Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual
Stores: World Wide Web Sites and the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1263 (1997); and Jane Kaufman Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable In-
struments and Digital Signatures, 49 S. CAR. L. REV. 739 (1998).
30. See supra note 14 (noting a potential alternative model of e-commerce).
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which parts of Article 2B apply to an e-commerce transaction. In particu-
lar, Article 2B applies its contract formation rules to so-called "mixed"
transactions composed of matters covered by and excluded from Article
2B creating potential for confusion both as to what is covered and as to
which parts of Article 2B constitute the contract formation rules. Third,
Article 2B undertakes to override important parts of pre-existing consumer
law in the interests of ease of use and national uniformity. Yet, the early
deployment of new, poorly understood, and potentially fallible technolo-
gies such as digital signatures and especially intelligent agents seems to be
an odd occasion for reducing consumer protections. Fourth, Article 2B
adopts a liability regime for digital signature-based e-commerce that has
been rejected by most states which have considered the issue.
A. Scope and Contract Formation
The first difficulty that confronts anyone seeking to understand the
likely effects of Article 2B on e-commerce is determining the range of
transactions likely to be affected by this Article. The very difficulty of this
task is itself one of the more troubling aspects of Article 2B. Whether or
not there already is too much legal uncertainty associated with e-
commerce, the need for additional uncertainty appears to be remarkably
low.
Certain parts of Article 2B have special application to electronic con-
tracts, notably sections 2B-113 to 2B-120 (collectively within Part I.B,
"Electronic Contracts: Generally") as well as Part 2 on contract formation,
section 2B- 107 on choice of law, section 2B- 108 on choice of forum, and
section 2B- 111 on manifesting assent. All these provisions arise in the
wake of Article 2B's scope provisions (sections 2B-103 to 2B-105), which
set out the range of transactions to which Article 2B should be applied,
and also discuss Article 2B's relationship to other law in the adopting
state. As issues of scope and relationship are fundamental, they provide
the starting point for an analysis of Article 2B's effects on e-commerce.
Section 2B-103(a) sets out what appears to be a quite limited reach for
Article 2B: the Article will apply to (1) licenses, software contracts, and
"access contracts," 3 1 and (2) "any agreement to provide support for,
maintain, or modify information related to a contract within the scope of
this article." 32 But the treatment of mixed contracts is actually rather more
31. "'Access contract' means a contract to electronically obtain access to, or infor-
mation in electronic form from, an information processing system. The term does not
include a contract for physical access to a place, such as a theater or building." U.C.C.
§ 2B-102(a)(l) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
32. Id. § 2B-103(a).
[Vol. 11:10231032
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far-reaching and complex (and much changed, at least in presentation,
from earlier versions of Article 2B). If Article 2B governs part of the
transaction and other contract law governs part, then Article 2B will apply
inter alia to information, informational rights and their documentation.
33
Article 2B will not apply to the conveyance of goods governed by Article
2 or 2A, unless those goods are licenses, software contracts, or access
contracts, in which case Article 2B trumps 2 and 2A after all. 34 Further-
more, section 2B-103(b) applies the contract formation rules of Article 2B
to all mixed transactions in which the parties agree to be bound by Article
2B.35 Even absent agreement, the contract formation terms of Article 2B
will apply to all mixed transactions involving services "or other subject
matter" not within Articles 2, 2A, or 2B, if the "information or services





Given the potentially wide reach of the contract formation terms of
Article 2B, it becomes essential to determine which parts of that Article
concern contract formation, and which are about something else. Alas, as
Article 2B does not define precisely which sections concern contract for-
mation there is room for confusion, both real and forensically feigned, as
to what precisely constitutes a contract formation term for an electronic
contract under Article 2B. The essence of a contract is .agreement on its
terms. Do rules about the terms of the contract constitute a contract for-
mation term? Is a rule about choice of law terms or venue terms a rule of
contract formation or interpretation and effect? Certainly all of Part 2 on
33. See id. § 2B-103(b).
34. According to section 2B-103(b)(2), Articles 2 or 2A also apply and Article 2B
does not- apply "as to subject matter that is excluded [from Article 2B1] under Section 2B-
104(3)," i.e. to the extent that a transaction:
(3) is a sale or lease of a copy of a computer program as part of a sale
or lease of goods that contain the computer program unless:
(A) the goods are merely a copy of the program;
(B) the goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or
(C) giving the purchaser of the goods access to or use of the com-
puter program is a material purpose of the transaction.
Id § 2B-104(3) (emphasis added). This is not very clear. Is the purchase of a computer
system, promoted as a word processing package and bundled with word processing soft-
ware, for the express purpose of writing a book, a transaction in which "giving the pur-
chaser ... access to or use of the computer program" is or is not "a material purpose of
the transaction"? If it is, then unraveling the double negative of sections 2B-103(b)(2)
and 2B-104(3)(C) suggests that Article 2B applies to the sale of the program and the
computer system.
35. Id. § 2B-103(b)(3)(A).
36. Id. § 2B-103(b)(3)(B).
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contract formation and terms falls within the contract formation rubric, but
other parts would seem to also. For example, Part I.A ("General Terms and
Scope") includes some sections that are part of contract formation, namely
the definitions in section 2B-102, and the scope provisions in sections 2B-
103 to 2B-105, discussed earlier, as well as sections that would not ordi-
narily be considered related to contract formation (e.g., section 2B-109 on
breach of contract). Similarly, Part I.B ("Electronic Contracts: Generally")
includes both rules of contract interpretation, (e.g., section 2B-1 15 "Effect
of Imposing a Commercially Unreasonable Attribution Procedure"), and
pure contract formation (e.g., section 2B- 119 "Electronic Agents Opera-
tions").
A Reporter's Note suggests that the purpose of this language is to al-
low "maximum scope to the contract formation rules and electronic com-
merce." 37 Indeed, even if the exact reach of the contract formation terms
cannot easily be discerned, it is evident that these terms will apply to a
range of transactions well beyond pure software licenses or intellectual
property licenses generally. Furthermore, if the parties agree, they can
choose to apply Article 2B to any transaction that does not fall un-
der either Article 2, or 2A-although in those cases, unlike those where
Article 2B applies by its own terms, existing consumer law rules remain
unaffected.38
B. Article 2B's Relationship to Existing Digital Signature Laws
One likely consequence of Article 2B's broad scope is that it will be
applied to many agreements concerning the issuance and maintenance of
digital signatures. Article 2B's effects on these transactions, as discussed
in more detail below, are likely to be unanticipated and unhelpful. The
potential for difficulties caused by Article 2B for purchasers and perhaps
issuers of digital signatures contrasts with the less troubling approach
adopted by the drafters of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
("UETA"). Article 2B and UETA originally shared a common general ap-
proach to the regulation of e-commerce, even if they differed on nomen-
clature. As the two drafting processes have proceeded, however, the
documents have evolved in different directions. Despite some significant
changes, Article 2B continues to take a relatively comprehensive and even
intrusive approach, while UETA has scaled back to a less ambitious but
perhaps more realistic strategy. Article 2B will affect everything from the
formation of digital signature agreements to the assignment of liability if
they go wrong. UETA now avoids the liability issue entirely.
37. Id. § 2B-103, Reporter's Note 5.
38. Id. §2B-103(c)(1).
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As of the April 15, 1998 draft of Article 2B-and in a sharp departure
from the March 1998 draft-Article 2B provides a savings clause for pre-
existing digital signature laws: "A statute authorizing electronic or digital
signatures in effect on the effective date of this article is not affected by
this article.",39 In contrast, earlier drafts of Article 2B had included the
following italicized language: "A statute authorizing electronic or digital
signatures in effect on the effective date of this article is not affected by
this article, but in the case of a conflict this article controls.' 4° While this
change is a welcome response to the complaint that Article 2B needlessly
overturned existing state experiments in digital signature regulation, it in-
troduces problems of its own. Grandfathering inevitably undermines uni-
formity, and thus undermines a major policy reason for even addressing
the issue of digital signatures in an Article of the U.C.C. ostensibly de-
voted to licensing. Conversely, were Article 2B to be widely adopted,
states with idiosyncratic digital signature laws would feel increasing pres-
sure to repeal their laws and conform to the emerging national standard.
The realities of national commerce mean that were Article 2B to be
adopted, its digital signature provisions stand a good chance of becoming
dominant; if so, the grandfathering of existing non-conforming state laws
is less meaningful than it might seem.
As currently drafted, the digital signature provisions of Article 2B
threaten to cause unneeded confusion. In Article 2B parlance, when Alice
associates a digital signature based on her private key to any digitized in-
formation, be it an e-mail, a World Wide Web page, a purchase order, a
program or a digitized movie, Alice authenticates that information. 41 Al-
though earlier drafts of UETA used the term signature in a similar way,
42
39. Id. § 2B-105(g). Note that this was section 104(c) in the April draft.
40. U.C.C. § 2B-104(c) (Mar. 1998 draft) (emphasis added).
41. Article 2B defines "Authenticate" as:
to sign, or otherwise to execute or adopt a symbol or sound, or encrypt
or similarly process a record in whole or part, with intent of the
authenticating person to:
(A) identify the person;
(B) adopt or accept the terms or a particular term of a record that
includes or is logically associated or linked with the authentication or
to which a record containing the authentication refers; or
(C) establish the integrity of the information in a record which in-
cludes or is logically associated or linked with the authentication or to
which a record containing the authentication refers."
U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(3) (Aug. I, 1998 Draft).
42. See, e.g., UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(a)(20) (Mar. 23,
1998 Draft) (defining "signature" as "any symbol, sound, process, or encryption of a rec-
ord in whole or in part, executed or adopted by a person or the person's electronic agent
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the UETA drafters have now changed their approach. The September 18,
1988 UETA draft defines a signature as "an identifying symbol, sound,
process, or encryption of a record in whole or in part, executed or adopted
by a person, as part of a record."43 The UETA formulation is now superior
to Article 2B's. The term signature is more likely to be familiar to the av-
erage person than authentication, and therefore more clearly embodies the
idea that legal consequences, such as the formation of contractual obliga-
tions, will tend to flow from certain uses of a digital signature. As dis-
cussed in more detail below, Article 2B's definition of authenticate ob-
scures the difference between "authenticating" a document in the sense of
showing it has not been altered and "signing" a document in the sense of
completing a legal formality signifying an intent to be bound. If Bob ap-
pends a digital signature to a contract labeled "DRAFT," it often will be
clear from the context that he intends only to demonstrate that it is his
draft, and not to extend a firm offer. But there will inevitably be circum-
stances where the course of conduct makes it less clear whether a digital
signature is associated to a document with the intent of authenticating or
signing it.44 Having one term do multiple duty risks confusion. A legal re-
form whose most immediate impact is that every risk-averse user of a
digital signature for authentication must keep separate keys for each type
of activity, and henceforth append a statement to message integrity
authentications saying "this digital signature is only an authentication of
the integrity of the message, it does not attest to the approval, acceptance
or accuracy of the content nor does it constitute either an offer or an ac-
ceptance" seems to be the sort of modernization one can do without.
C. Article 2B Applied to CAs and the Conveyance of Certificates
Most models of digital signature-based commerce assume that some
sort of trusted third parties, usually called Certificate Authorities (CAs),
will provide essential intermediation services to participants in e-
with intent to: (A) identify that person; (B) adopt or accept a term or a record; or (C) es-
tablish the informational integrity of a record or term that contains the signature or to
which a record containing the signature refers."), available at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecicta/eta398.htm>.
43. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(a)(20) (Sept. 18, 1998 Draft),
available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecicta/eta1098.htm>.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89. Compare Guideline 1.4 of the ABA
Digital Signature Guidelines, which defines "authentication" as: "A process used to as-
certain the identity of a person or the integrity of specific information. For a message,
authentication involves ascertaining its source and that it has not been modified or re-
placed in transit." This definition excludes signing with an intent to be bound. See
DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES § 5.2 (1996), available at <http://www.abanet.org/
scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html>.
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commerce. The drafters of Article 2B do not seem to have appreciated the
extent to which Article 2B will apply not only to the users of digital sig-
natures but also to the parties who may issue the certificates on which
digital signature users must rely. Article 2B is likely to apply to the origi-
nal provision of a certificate, and to the database services that make cer-
tificates reliable. Exactly when and to what extent Article 2B will apply is
somewhat uncertain because it seems the drafters did not envision such
highly customized transactions would nonetheless have mass market char-
acteristics.
Imagine the following somewhat simplified set of related transactions.
Alice, a merchant, intends to engage in e-commerce. As a first step, Alice
contacts a CA in order to acquire one of the CA's digital certificates at-
testing to the linkage between Alice's public key and Alice's real-life
identity. Bob, a consumer, contacts a different CA to acquire a certificate
for his public key. The CAs may require some proof of ID, a payment,
perhaps even some other form of security. Suppose Alice and Bob, neither
of whom have any fraudulent designs, honestly provide everything re-
quired. If the CAs issue X.509-style certificates, currently the most com-
mon kind, the certificates will include several data elements, including a
copy of Alice's public key signed by each CA's private key, a reliance
limit, an expiration date, and a reference to the URL where each CA's cer-
tification practice statement (CPS) resides.45 The CA's contract with its
customers, and probably the certificates as well, will incorporate the CPS
by reference.
46
Suppose Bob visits Alice's web page and places an order for a com-
puter program. If Alice's web site is signed with her private key, and if her
certificate is compatible with Bob's browser, Bob can check the CA's cer-
tificate revocation list (CRL) to ensure that Alice's web page is truly hers,
and not a spoof nor a hack. 7 Once reassured that Alice's key remains
valid and uncompromised, Bob can send Alice his payment details with
less fear that they will be going to a malicious third party pretending to be
Alice.48
45. For a state-of-the-art CPS see Verisign Certification Practice Statement (May
15, 1997) <https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS 1.2/CPS I .2.pdf>.
46. See generally Froomkin, supra note 9, at 55-65, 97.
47. For an example of a CRL lookup form see VeriSign, Verify the Status of a
Digital ID, (visited Nov. 19, 1998) <http://digitalid.verisign.com/status.htm>.
48. 1 have argued elsewhere that the second part of this scenario has some limits. If,
for example, Bob is paying by credit card, the credit card company fulfills the role of
trusted third party and there is little reason for Alice to require Bob to guild the lily with a
certificate. Indeed, to the extent that the credit card company functions as an insurer,
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If Alice is licensing information, with delivery online, she may be par-
ticularly interested in learning where Bob lives (as this may affect what
law applies), and in making sure that Bob is who he says he is (as this may
become relevant if he violates the terms of his license). Thus, if Alice re-
quests Bob's public key and his certificate, she will want assurances that
Bob's key remains valid and uncompromised. One way for Alice to con-
firm this is to consult the CA's CRL. If Bob's certificate checks out, Alice
will complete the transaction.
It can be seen from the foregoing that in e-commerce models which
rely on certificates verified by reference to a CRL, the CA is really pro-
viding two different things to Alice and Bob: 1) the certificate itself, and
2) access to a CRL. It is not an exaggeration to say that for these certifi-
cates, the CRL is at least as important as the original certificate. 49 The
original, after all, will be generated only once; the CRL needs to be con-
stantly available on a 24 hour a day, 7 day a week basis ("24x7"), and may
be referenced any number of times by parties unknown at the time the
certificate is created. 50
1. Certification Services
Once Article 2B is enacted, CAs may find that its provisions allow
them to structure the sale of certificates and certificate services in a man-
ner that reduces their liabilities. The CA may structure the provision of a
certificate as a sale, in which case Article 2 might apply absent other
agreement. Subject to the doubts about the applicability of U.C.C. Article
there is little incentive for Bob to worry about the validity of Alice's public key either,
since he bears little or no risk of loss. See generally Froomkin, supra note 9, at 68. Nev-
ertheless, as the scenario in the text appears to animate most digital signature statutes, it
remains worth considering.
49. Indeed, failure to consult a CRL before relying on a certificate in these models
likely would be per se negligence. See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES § 5.4 (1996),
available at <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html>. A person who negli-
gently uses an attribution procedure that could have been adequate may be estopped from
pleading reliance upon the attribution procedure of which the certificate is a part, since
only those who act reasonably are entitled to claim this type of reliance. See, e.g.,
U.C.C.§ 2B-117(4) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft) ("If the sender complies with the attribution
procedure, but the receiving party does not, and the change or error would have been de-
tected had the receiving party also complied, the sender is not bound by the error or
change.").
50. On the other hand, one can also imagine alternate e-commerce models using
digital signatures backed by certificates which do not rely on CRLs, perhaps because
parties always demand reasonably fresh certificates, and the market responds by having
CAs provide a continual stream of newly minted but short-lived certificates. This, more
or less, is the model discussed in Rivest, supra note 14.
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2 to intangible goods, this might work for the sale of the certificate alone,
but it looks like a poor bet for the CA if the CA sells a package consisting
of a certificate and CRL services:
The view that a CA is providing a service (or a hybrid in which
the service element predominates) appears more convincing than
the alternative under either the "predominant factor" test or the
"final product" test .... To issue a certificate worthy of trust, the
CA must: (1) have a valid and verifiable certificate of its own;
(2) conduct the inquiry on which the certificate will be based; (3)
accurately state facts in the certificate, including both the facts
about the subject and the facts about the CA's investigation; and
(4) maintain a CRL. The CA's continuing duty to maintain the
CRL in a form that can be rapidly and efficiently used by persons
wishing to rely on a certificate is in itself significant evidence
that the service element predominates in what the CA is selling.5'
Even if the provision of the original certificate is an Article 2 sale, the
provision of CRL services is unlikely to be a sale in most states. Indeed,
states that use a predominant purpose test are unlikely to treat even the
sale of the certificate as falling under Article 2. This legal vacuum will be
readily filled by Article 2B.
If Article 2B is enacted, CAs may structure their deal as a license, in
which case Article 2B would apply by default. In previous drafts of Arti-
cle 2B it appeared that the provision of a certificate was excluded from
Article 2B's definition of a "mass-market transaction," since each certifi-
cate is tailor-made for a customer and Article 2B's definition of a mass
market transaction required that the information being licensed to each
consumer be the "same information." 52 In contrast, the current draft de-
fines a mass market transaction as including any "transaction within this
article that is a consumer transaction," 53 i.e., any transaction in which a
51. Froomkin, supra note 9, at 89-90.
52. For example, in the March 1998 draft, Article 2B defined a mass market trans-
action as a "consumer transaction ... directed to the general public ... for the same in-
formation." U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(31) (Mar. 1998 Draft). The term excluded "a transaction
in which the information is or becomes customized or otherwise specially prepared by the
licensor for the licensee." Id at § 2B-102(a)(31)(C). If a certificate is not the subject of a
mass market transaction, by definition it cannot be covered by a "mass-market license"
since a "'[m]ass-market license' means a standard form that is prepared for and used in a
mass-market transaction." Id. § 2B-102(a)(30). As a result, various consumer protections
designed to apply to mass market transactions would not have applied to CAs under the
March 1998 formula.
53. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(32) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
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consumer5 4 is the licensee. 5 Thus, under the current definition, a CA's
provision of a certificate and CRL services to a consumer would be a mass
market transaction, even though one suspects that the drafters' operating
image of a consumer transaction remains one in which a person acquires a
standardized program rather than a bespoke certificate.
As a result-unlike in previous drafts of Article 2B-the consumer
protections in Article 2B that apply to mass market transactions5 6 and li-
censes appear to apply to CAs that transact with consumers, although ap-
parently not to CAs when they transact with other businesses. The Re-
porter's Notes conflict with this reading, however. For example, although
section 2B-102(a)(32) defines a mass market transaction broadly, Re-
porter's Note 28 following that section cautions that the "definition must
be applied in light of its intended function." 57 And, as in previous drafts of
Article 2B, the consumer transactions envisaged are those in which every
consumer acquires identical information, i.e., "relatively small dollar
value, routine and anonymous transactions that occur in a retail market
available to and used by the general public ... where information is made
available in pre-packaged form under generally similar terms to the gen-




This is a vision that would tend to exclude certificates, since every certifi-
cate must include the unique public key of the party being certified, and by
their very nature few of these transactions will be anonymous. Worse, the
same Reporter's Note states that the mass market transactions "concept
applies only to information aimed at the general public as a whole, in-
cluding consumers. It does not include products directed at a limited sub-
group of the general public or restricted to members of an organization or
to persons with a separate relationship to the information provider."59 Per-
haps this is merely a carry-over from earlier versions and will also be re-
54. "Consumer" is defined at section 2B-102(a)(10).
55. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(1 1) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
56. The drafters identify the following as consumer protections in mass market
transactions: "The provisions of this Article that provide additional consumer protections
include: 2B-107 (choice of law); 2B-118 (electronic error); 2B-208 (limit on mass market
license; right to refund); 2B-303 (limit on no-oral modification clause); 2B-304 (limit on
modification of continuing contract); 2B-406 (warranty disclaimer); 2B-409 (third-party
beneficiary); 2B-609 (perfect tender); 2B-619 (limit on hell and high water clauses); 2B-
703 (exclusion of personal injury claim)." Id § 2B-105, Reporter's Note 5.
To what extent each of these matter in the context of a CA is another debate; one
place where it matters whether a transaction is mass market or not is the extent to which
warranty disclaimers must be conspicuous. See id § 2B-406 (b)(4).
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vised to match the changes in the definition, as otherwise it risks creating
confusion.
One might also reasonably question whether the CA's provision of a
certificate to a customer could alternately be considered the provision of
an informational good within the purview of Article 2B. A certificate is
certainly information, but it might be argued that in demanding and
checking information about the subject of a certificate, the CA is per-
forming a service whose predominant purpose is outside the scope of Arti-
cle 2B, just as a lawyer or valuer who memorializes her professional
opinion on paper or in an e-mail does not therefore fall within Article 2B's
scope. 60 Whether a CA provides a professional service sufficiently like a
lawyer or valuer to say that the memorialization is merely incident to the
provision of a professional service is open to debate; conceivably it might
turn on the quality or nature of the investigation or other initial inquiry
performed by the CA.6 1 This uncertainty is unhelpful.
In addition to controlling the form of the transaction, the CA has a
number of options for manipulating the transaction's reality. A CA that
chose to "sell" certificates could simply transmit the information to a cli-
ent; a CA that wanted to emphasize the license or services nature of the
transaction could ask clients to enter into a license agreement, by which
the CA agrees to make the certificate available on a Web page to all who
wish to see it. Current practice seems to be to convey certificates to cus-
tomers. Verisign, for example, does not currently use license language to
describe what happens when it creates a certificate for a consumer. This
60. See id. § 2B-104(5) (excluding contract for "personal or entertainment serv-
ices"); see id. Reporter's Note 2.
61. See Froomkin, supra note 9, at 87-88:
A certificate resembles a professional's opinion in that a certificate or-
dinarily is the tangible memorial of a process of analysis in which the
subject's credentials were checked in some manner. On the other hand,
a certificate differs from a professional's opinion in some ways that
may be relevant. Any trustworthy CA will be managed by a profes-
sional-someone who knows how to run a trustworthy computer sys-
tem-but it is not inevitable that the actual checking of credentials in
all cases will be the sort of activity traditionally undertaken by profes-
sionals. If Alice's certificates are founded on checking the subject's
passport, it may well be that the person who actually examines Alice's
passport and issues her certificate is a clerk who has been trained in
passport authentication, not an expert like a surveyor or valuer. There
is no policy reason, however, why the classification of a certificate as a
good or service should turn on whether the person making the report
happens to be a professional.
1998]
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may change. Already, both VeriSign's public keys and its CPS are made
available to the public as licensed information.
62
2. Provision ofAccess Services
While one might debate whether a CA's provision of a certificate falls
within Article 2B, there seems far less doubt that the CA's provision of
CRL services falls squarely within Article 2B's provisions relating to ac-
cess to databases. The CRL is a database, and Bob's right to access it, or to
point others towards it, is a license. This makes Bob's access to the CRL
an access contract contemplated by Article 2B.63 Furthermore, many of the
parties consulting a CA's CRL are likely to be persons with no pre-existing
contractual relationship with the CA. If Alice gets her certificate from a
CA, Bob will need to consult its CRL whether or not he happens to have
purchased anything from that CA. If the CA's provision of the certificate is
not a license, (which seems to be current practice) but the provision of
CRL services is, then either we have two separate transactions potentially
governed by different rules, or one mixed transaction-parts of which may
or may not be governed by different rules.
Before proceeding with the effect of treating a CA's business as in-
volving a "mixed" transaction, one possible objection deserves to be
noted. One might argue that a CA's services fall within the "core financial
62. "VeriSign public keys: VeriSign root public keys, including all PCA public
keys, are the property of VeriSign, Inc. VeriSign licenses relying parties to use such keys
only in conjunction with trustworthy hardware or software product in which the root
public key is distributed with VeriSign's authority." VeriSign CPS, supra note 45, at
§ 12.13; see also id. at i (describing right to reproduce CPS itself in license terms).
63. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(l) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft) (defining "access con-
tract" as "a contract to electronically obtain access to, or information in electronic form
from, an information processing system. The term does not include a contract for physi-
cal access to a place, such as a theater or building."); see also id § 2B-615 ("Access
Contracts"). There are potential conflicts between some of the rules for access contracts,
(e.g., section 2B-107(b) on choice of law for access contracts) which provides that even
in a consumer transaction "[a]n access contract or a contract providing for electronic de-
livery of a copy is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the licensor is located
when the agreement is made" and the general deference to digital signature laws in sec-
tion 2B-105(g) since some state digital signature laws require that parts of their own law
be applied regardless of the physical location of the CA. See, e.g., Washington Electronic
Authentication Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.220(3) (1997) (providing that CA must
certify to "all those who reasonably rely on the information" that information in certifi-
cate and listed as confirmed is accurate, that subscribers 'accepted certificate; that all in-
formation foreseeably material to reliability of the certificate is stated or incorporated by
reference in the certificate; and that CA complied with Authentication Act and other ap-
plicable laws of the state).
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functions" 64 exceptions to Article 2B's scope. Article 2B does not apply
"to the extent that a transaction ... provides access to, use, transfer, clear-
ance, settlement, or processing of ... identifying, verifying, access-
enabling, authorizing, or monitoring information" that is related to elec-
tronic cash, an "instrument," as defined in section 3-305, or the wholesale
or retail transfer of funds including credit and debit card transactions.
65
Arguably the CA's contract with Alice to create a certificate is an agree-
ment "that provides access to .... identifying, authenticating [or] ...
authorizing information" that may well at some future date be "related to"
electronic cash, or the retail transfer of funds. The problem, however, is
that many certificates are and will be general-purpose identification cer-
tificates, and at the time Bob acquires the certificate neither he nor the CA
may know what he intends to use it for. The time that a customer makes
the agreement with the CA seems by far the most reasonable time to de-
termine what law applies to the contract. Otherwise, this "core financial
functions" exclusion might suddenly spring into effect if Bob one day
used his certificate and Alice did a CRL lookup on it to support a transac-
tion that involved electronic cash ("e-cash"). It seems more reasonable,
therefore, to read the core financial functions exception in section 2B-
104(4) as excluding the e-cash portion of every transaction in which e-
cash is used, but not to every certificate.
If a CA's provision of a certificate and CRL services makes its deal
with Alice and Bob a mixed transaction, it appears from the scope provi-
sions of Article 2B that at least the contract formation parts of Article 2B
will apply to the CA's relationships with Alice and Bob in the example
above-even if the CA was able to categorize its provision of the original
certificate as a sale of data rather than a license. Recall that according to
section 2B-103(b)(3), even if the parties have made no agreement to in-
voke Article 2B, Article 2B's contract formation terms apply to the entire
transaction if "the transaction involves services or other subject matter not
within this article or Article 2 or Article 2A and the information or serv-
ices that are within the scope of this article are the predominant purpose of
the transaction." 66 "Services" is not a defined term in section 2B- 102, and
64. U.C.C. § 2B-104, Reporter's Note 5 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
65. Id § 2B-104.
66. id. § 2B-103(b)(3)(B). In addition, section 2B-103 (c) states that the parties may
agree that all of Article 2B applies: so long as this agreement does not alter mandatory
consumer protections rules that would otherwise apply, and so long as this agreement
does not remove a transaction from either U.C.C. Article 2 or U.C.C. Article 2A when
one of those articles would otherwise apply. See id. § 2B-103(c).
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the only other reference to services in section 2B-104 seems irrelevant.6 7 If
the term services is distinct from the sale of goods, as it is, for example, in
U.C.C. Article 2,68 but it includes the performance of an access contract,
then section 2B- 103 creates the risk of an anomalous situation: whether all
of a transaction whose predominant purpose is the licensing of information
would fall under Article 2B might depend on whether the transaction hap-
pened to include the provision of an incidental non-sale service.
Article 2B's reliance on Article 2's goods/services distinction is odd
and slightly uncomfortable since a primary objective of Article 2B was
supposed to be to erase that distinction. As Article 2B's Preface notes, the
"distinction that used to be drawn between 'goods' and 'services' is
meaningless, because so much of the value provided by the successful en-
terprise ... entails services [and information] .,,69 Nevertheless, the current
draft of Article 2B adopts the predominant purpose test 70 for determining
when Article 2B should apply to a mixed transaction, 71 a test which will
be familiar to U.C.C. lawyers from the context of Article 2. This is a sub-
stantial change from earlier versions of Article 2B: until recently, Article
67. Section 2B-104(5) states that 2B will not apply to the extent that an agreement
"is a contract for personal or entertainment services by an individual or group of indi-
viduals, other than a contract of an independent contractor to develop, support, modify or
maintain software." Interestingly, if somewhat puzzlingly, the Reporter's Note states that
this exclusion "does not exclude situations where automation creates a digital replace-
ment for activities previously characterized as personal services." Id. § 2B-104, Re-
porter's Note 6.
68. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1996) states that "unless the context otherwise requires, this
Article applies to transactions in goods ... "
69. U.C.C. 2B, Preface, p.6 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft) (quoting ROBERT REICH, THE
WORK OF NATIONS 85-86 (1991)) (alterations in original).
70. On the "predominant purpose" test, see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3-4 (4th ed. 1995) ("If a sale of goods is not the
'predominant purpose,' then [the U.C.C. Article] does not apply at all.").
71. See U.C.C. § 2B-103, Reporter's Note 5:
Formation Rules. Subsection (b)(3) addresses an effect created by Ar-
ticle 2B contract formation rules and the fact that Article 2B validates
electronic commerce practices that may not be effective under com-
mon law or under current Article 2 or 2A. The subsection applies Arti-
cle 2B formation rules to the entire transaction if Article 2B subject
matter constitutes the predominant purpose of the transaction itself.
This allows maximum scope to the contract formation rules and elec-
tronic commerce.
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2B rejected the predominant purpose test in favor of a considerably more
nebulous gravaman of the action test.
72
3. The Bottom Line: Effect ofArticle 2B on CA Transactions
It follows from the above that Article 2B will confuse as much as it
clarifies the legal duties and contractual rights of CAs and their customers.
In a state with no digital signature laws, 73 Article 2B will ensure that
contracts for the licensing of information, and also mixed contracts that
are formed via electronic contracting supported by properly implemented
and deployed digital signatures, are as valid as contracts formed in a tradi-
tional fashion. Furthermore, in states that do not have pre-existing digital
signature laws, or whose existing laws do not address contract formation
or warranty issues, Article 2B is likely to have the following effects on
contracts for the provision of a certificate and associated access to a CRL :
(1) If the conveyance of a certificate is a license of information within Ar-
ticle 2B, then both the certificate and the CRL lookup services are
within all of Article 2B, since the CRL lookup service, an "access
contract," is clearly covered by Article 2B.
(2) If the conveyance of a certificate is merely the memorialization of a
service, akin to a lawyer's or valuer's opinion, then so long as the cer-
tificate relies on a CRL for its validity there is a good chance that the
contract formation rules of Article 2B may apply to the entire transac-
tion, since the initial certification service is a "service[] that [is] not
within this article" and, arguably, "the information that is within this
article"-the access to the CRL-is the predominant purpose of the
transaction. 74 All of Article 2B applies to the customer's access to the
72. See U.C.C. § 2B-103, Reporter's Note 3 (Mar. 1998 draft) ("This Article ap-
plies to the extent that the transaction involves subject matter within its scope, but not to
the extent that a particular subject matter or aspect of a relationship is excluded or other-
wise outside the scope.") The tautological reassurance that what is excluded is excluded,
and what is included is included was not comforting and seemed to mean that if the pre-
dominant purpose of the transaction is within Article 2B, then the contract formation
rules-but not the other parts-of Article 2B applied to the entire transaction. Whatever
it meant, we are well rid of it.
73. The situation in states with pre-existing digital signature laws may be even more
complex. These statutes are not uniform, and Article 2B does not seek to displace them.
See U.C.C. § 2B-105(g) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft). To the extent that some of these statutes
may have explicit contract formation terms, beyond defining a "writing," those terms will
trump anything in 2B. See id. In the absence of an explicit provision to the contrary,
however, Article 2B's terms will presumably control, including the treatment of mixed
transactions described in this section.
74. See id § 2B-103(b)(3)(B).
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CRL, but only the contract formation rules apply to the initial genera-
tion and conveyance of the certificate, and to its updates.
(3) If the conveyance of the certificate is a sale, or if the CRL service is
not the "predominant purpose" of the entire transaction, then different
contract formation rules may apply to the certificate and the CRL even
if they are acquired in a single transaction.
(4) If the conveyance of the certificate is outside Article 2B for any rea-
son, and the certificate if of a type that does not require a CRL look'up
to be valid, then Article 2B probably does not apply to the CA's part of
the transaction.
Could not law reform come up with something more straightforward?
Moreover, the application of Article 2B to the CA's provision of CRL
services threatens some odd results. CRLs online subject to Article 2B
may be relieved of the burden of being constantly online and accessible.
According to section 2B-615(a)(3), access pursuant to a contract that pro-
vides for continuous access,
(3) must be available at times and in a manner:
(A) conforming to the express terms of the contract; and
(B) to the extent not expressly dealt with by the contract, in a
manner and with a quality that is reasonable in light of the ordi-
nary standards of the business, trade, or industry for the particu-
lar type of contract.
On the other hand, and of potentially greater relevance to most CA's pro-
vision of retail CRL lookup services, section 2B-615(b) provides:
(b) In an access contract that gives the licensee a right of access
at times substantially of its own choosing during agreed periods
of time, an intermittent and occasional failure to have access
available during those times is not a breach of contract if it is:
(1) consistent with the express terms of the contract;
(2) consistent with ordinary standards of the business,
trade, or industry for the particular type of contract; or
(3) caused by scheduled downtime, reasonable needs for
maintenance, reasonable periods of equipment, software, or
communications failure, or events reasonably beyond the licen-
sor's control.75
There seems to be a conflict between the requirement in section 2B-
615(a) that access conform to the express terms of the contract, and the
75. Id. § 2B-615.
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terms of section 2B-615(b), which suggests that even when a contract pro-
vides for occasional access on a 24x7 basis, an intermittent and occasional
failure of access is not necessarily a breach of contract. Every access con-
tract for intermittent access drafted by a minimally competent lawyer is
going to have some representation about the nature and quality of the
service to be provided. Either the contract will promise uninterrupted 24x7
service, or the promise will be hedged with some sort of limitations. In
contracts with any specific representation about quality of service, section
2B-615(b) becomes relevant only if the provider's express limitations are
less sweeping than those set by Article 2B. Yet, in the absence of a more
sweeping disclaimer, the subscriber would be entitled to think that the
contract explicitly provides for a higher level of service. Perhaps section
2B-615(b) can best be understood as applying only to access contracts that
have no agreed terms about quality of service at all. The text invites a
broader reading, 76 but anything broader risks causing great confusion.
Suppose that a CA promises "24-hour-a-day access to the CRL" or "best
efforts for 24x7" or "access any time." Which of those make full-time ac-
cess an express term of the contract? If a given formulation is an express
promise of uninterrupted access, but a court finds that industry practice
allows for substantial downtime, why should that norm be allowed to
trump the express contractual term? At present, a CA's potential custom-
ers have.almost no way of discerning industry norms, if indeed any have
yet been born. As a result, there may be no norms for a CA to invoke; if
there are, however, it is unclear why the CA should be allowed to do so if
it has made any stronger contractual representations as to service reliabil-
ity. Nor is it evident why lawyers should have to argue whether a blue
screen of death 77 is a reasonable software failure rather than the unreason-
able sort.
It may be that the computer technology backing up online services and
especially the Internet generally remains sufficiently experimental and un-
reliable that providers need some sort of safe harbor provision to excuse
unforeseeable breaches in service. Even so, the solution is to craft a stan-
76. The word "or" at the end of section 2B-615(b)(2) suggests that one should read
an "or" into the end of section 2B-615(b)(l) and that therefore each of the three circum-
stances listed in section 2B-615(b) are independent defenses against claims for breach of
contract.
77. The Free On-Line Dictionary of Computing defines the "blue screen of death"
as "[t]he infamous white-on-blue text screen which appears when Microsoft Windows
crashes. BSOD is mostly seen on the 16-bit systems such as Windows 3.1, but also on
Windows 95 and ... Windows NT 4." Free On-Line Dictionary of Computing, Blue
Screen of Death (Sept. 9, 1998) <http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/
foldoc.cgi?blue+screen+of+death>.
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dard from contract language that allows providers to distinguish between
regular service and premium. Not only should the language itself put a
reader on notice that the ordinary 24x7 promise may mean less than it
seems, but a CA which chooses to make an express contractual commit-
ment to provide full-blooded 24x7 service should be able to do so-and
customers should have a right of action if the service nonetheless fails to
perform as promised.
Each of the criticisms set out above arises from the same fundamental
problem. CAs are in a business that has a number of characteristics differ-
entiating it from the more ordinary sales and licenses that appear to have
been contemplated by the drafters of Article 2B. Rules designed for soft-
ware licenses, access to LEXIS or Westlaw, or to marketing databases,
simply do not work well when applied to a CA's provision of certificates
and CRL lists. The difficulty of fitting an erratically shaped peg with sub-
stantially unknown tensile properties into even a good-sized round hole
suggests rather strongly that Article 2B's attempt to draft comprehensive
rules for e-commerce as an adjunct to its licensing rules was simply too
ambitious.
D. Consumer Law and Electronic Transactions
Although section 2B- 105(d) sets out a general principle that Article 2B
will defer to a law that "establishes a consumer protection," this general
principle is subject to four significant exceptions which substantially alter
consumer protections for electronic transactions. The Reporter's Notes
claims that these four derogations from state consumer law "reflect a lim-
ited approach that balances the modernization theme and the desire not to
alter existing protection."78 In so doing, however, Article 2B undermines
the consumer law requirements it seeks to modernize and risks leaving
consumers particularly vulnerable to more modem threats caused by
hacked software and rogue electronic agents. 79 In this regard, it may be
relevant to note that the UNCITRAL model law, which appears to have
inspired at least some of Article 2B's approach to electronic contracting,
80
specifically defers to all relevant consumer law.
8
Taken either individually or as a group, these four derogations are sig-
nificant. First, any requirement that a contractual obligation, waiver, notice
78. Id. § 2B-105(d), Reporter's Note 6.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 105-116.
80. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2B- 16, Reporter's Note 2 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
81. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, at art. 1, n.** ("This Law does not
override any rule of law intended for the protection of consumers.").
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or disclaimer be in writing is satisfied by "a record,, 8 2 which is defined as
"information inscribed on a tangible medium or stored in an electronic or
other medium and retrievable in perceivable form." 83 Thus, notwithstand-
ing any state consumer law to the contrary, contractual terms, waivers, no-
tices and disclaimers need not actually be retrieved by the consumer "in
perceivable form"; the consumer need not even decline an offer to read it.
The principle that an electronic message should have no less binding legal
consequences and effects than one on paper seems entirely sensible and is
a common theme in even the most modest law reform efforts relating to e-
commerce. That modest and uncontroversial end is achieved by section
2B-113,84 and by section 301 of the Draft Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act (UETA). 85 But Article 2B's exception to the writing requirement in
section 2B-104 goes farther than the minimum, since it does not require
actual perception of the writing by either a human being or her electronic
agents. For example, a sufficiently prominent link to a web site that con-
tains required disclosures satisfies a disclosure requirement even if the
consumer did not click on the link. Some consumer contracts today pur-
port to incorporate by reference standardized terms that the ordinary con-
sumer never sees; to the extent that online contracting puts those terms a
click away, meaningful disclosure will be improved. But to the extent that
state statutes require that contractual obligations, waivers, notices or dis-
claimers actually be visible to the consumer, enforcing clickwrap 86 con-
tracts in which key terms are one hyperlink (or more?) away from the
viewer does not further the objective of meaningful disclosure.
Second, a requirement that a contractual term be "signed" is satisfied
by an "authentication. " 87 Section 2B-102(a)(3)defines the act of authenti-
cation as:
to sign, or otherwise to execute or adopt a symbol or sound, or
encrypt or similarly process a record in whole or part, with intent
of the authenticating person to:
82. U.C.C. § 2B-105(e)(1) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
83. Id. § 2B-102(a)(39).
84. See id § 2B-113 ("A record or authentication may not be denied legal effect,
solely on the ground that it is in electronic form.").
85. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 301 (Sept. 18, 1998 Draft), avail-
able at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecicta/etaI098.htm>.
86. Clickwrap licenses are "textual windows of non-negotiable, take-it-or-leave-it
contract terms that prompt a user to 'click' assent [on a web form or program button]
before allowing installation of a program or access to a website." Keith Aoki, The Stakes
of Intellectual Property Law (visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.law.uoregon.edu/
-kaoki/AOKI.html>.
87. U.C.C. § 2B-105(e)(2) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
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(A) identify the person;
(B) adopt or accept the terms or a particular term of a re-
cord that includes or is logically associated or linked with the
authentication or to which a record containing the authentication
refers; or
(C) establish the integrity of the information in a record
which includes or is logically associated or linked with the
authentication or to which a record containing the authentication
refers.8
8
Under this definition, any application of a digital signature by a con-
sumer to a contractual term proffered by a merchant, even one merely in-
tended to attest to its integrity, theoretically could be considered a signa-
ture in the teeth of contrary consumer law. It would be unreasonable to
intend that any type of authentication should satisfy a statutory require-
ment that a contract be signed, as opposed to those authentications that are
intended to manifest an intent to be bound or which are commonly under-
stood to manifest an intention to be bound. Alas, if one takes seriously the
broad definition of authentication, other actions, which neither result from
an intent to be bound nor manifest that intent, could be held to have con-
tractually binding effects.8 9 This is surely not what the drafters of Article
2B intend; rather, it seems to be an accident caused by the drafting style.
Indeed, participants in the Article 2B drafting process insist vociferously
that Article 2B adopts an intentionality requirement throughout and that no
court would be so foolish as find that an authentication intended to serve
only to show the integrity of a record had unintentionally served to form a
contract. 90 The trouble is that section 2B-1 11 says clearly that a manifes-
tation of assent is accomplished by an "authentication." And, despite what
88. Id. § 2B-102(a)(3).
89. Cf U.C.C. § 2B- 119(c) ("Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, authen-
tication is deemed to have been done with the intent to establish the person's identity, its
adoption or acceptance of the record or term, its acceptance of the contract, and the integ-
rity of the records or terms as of the time of the authentication.") (emphasis added).
90. See, e.g., Letter from Donald A. Cohn & Mary Jo Howard Divley to Carlyle C.
Ring (Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/cdm1O98.html> ("What does it
take for me to manifest assent to a license under the proposed draft? First, I must be act-
ing either with knowledge or after having had an opportunity to review the record or
term. (Under Section 112, if I don't have the opportunity to see the record before I pay
for the product, I must be given the unconditional right to return it if, after I do see the
record, I don't accept any part of it, even if the product is fine.) If I use conduct, I must
intend that conduct and I must know or have reason to know that the other party may
infer from my conduct that I assented to the record or term.... Just because we are deal-
ing with certain new subject matter does not mean that all courts will suddenly lose their
reason.")
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the drafters say they intend, an authentication can be any one of the things
defined in section 2B-102, including authentications intended only to at-
test to message integrity. If one is going to enact a forward-looking reform
of e-commerce law, it ought not to offer judges an opportunity to fall into
easy formalist traps.
As a result of this possible confusion, in jurisdictions where Article 2B
controls, well-advised parties will have to include disclaimers every time
they use a digital signature, warning counter parties that "the use of this
digital signature is not intended to create a contract." This is unhelpful and
threatens to put a large damper on the growth of digital signature-based e-
commerce.
Third, a consumer law requirement of assent to a specific contractual
term is satisfied by "an action that manifests assent to a term in accor-
dance with this article." 91 As of this writing, however, the section on mani-
festation of assent appears to be in a state of flux.92 Currently, Article 2B
provides several means by which assent may occur, including an authenti-
cation after an opportunity to review,93 whether or not the review actually
happened. Moreover, electronic agents can assent on behalf of their mas-
ters. The opportunity to review can be satisfied if it suffices to "enable a
reasonably configured electronic agent to react to the record or term."
94
What a reasonably configured electronic agent might look like, however,
nobody knows.
91. U.C.C. § 2B-105(e)(4) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
92. For example, section 2B-1I I of the August 1998 draft is heavily annotated with
editorial cautions that the text has yet to be reviewed by the Drafting Committee. Simi-
larly, the current UETA draft has bracketed section 107 on manifestation of assent, al-
though it is clear that UETA intends to draw a sharp distinction between authentications
and contractual commitments. See UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 107
(Sept. 18, .1998 Draft), available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecicta/
eta 1098.htm> and accompanying notes.
93. Opportunity to review is defined in section 2B-1 12. The critical part of the defi-
nition reads:
(a) A person or electronic agent has an opportunity to review a record
or term only if the record or term is made available in a manner that:
(1) in the case of a person, ought to call it to the attention of a rea-
sonable person and permit review; or
(2) in the case of an electronic agent, would enable a reasonably
configured electronic agent to react to the record or term.
U.C.C. § 2B-1 12 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
The Draft UETA section 108 contains similar language, but the section is bracketed
for further discussion. See UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 108 (Sept. 18,
1998 Draft), available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/Iibrary/ulc/uecicta/etaI098.htm>.
94. U.C.C. § 2B-1 12(a) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Last, but not least, a requirement in state consumer law "that a con-
tractual term be conspicuous or the like" is satisfied by a term that meets
the conspicuousness requirements of Article 2B. Currently, a term is "con-
spicuous" under Article 2B when it is:
so written, displayed, or otherwise presented that a reasonable
person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed or be-
come aware of it. In the case of an electronic record intended to
evoke a response by an electronic agent, a term is conspicuous if
it is presented in a form that would enable a reasonably config-
ured electronic agent to take it into account or react without re-
view of the record by an individual. Conspicuous terms include
but are not limited to the following:
(A) with respect to a person:
(i) a heading in capitals in larger or other con-
trasting type or color than the surrounding text;
(ii) language in a record or display in larger or
other contrasting type or color than other language or set
off from other language by symbols or other marks that
call attention to the language; or
(iii) a term prominently referenced in an elec-
tronic record or display which is readily accessible and
reviewable from the record or display; and
(B) with respect to a person or an electronic agent, a
term or a reference to a term that is so placed. in a record or dis-
play that the person or electronic agent cannot proceed without
taking some additional action with respect to the term. 95
Thus, conspicuousness is explicitly satisfied by most conceivable
types of clickwrap, or by a hypertext link to a page containing the required
term even if the consumer does not visit the page and is thus not actually
exposed to required language, so long as "a reasonable person ... ought to
have noticed or become aware of it."96 Current browser and e-mail tech-
nology makes it difficult, albeit not impossible, for the author of an elec-
tronic document to control how the reader will display it. It follows that
familiar paper-based requirements such as a minimum sized typeface
probably should not be carried over to electronic contracts. Reliance on
prominence and the reasonable reader may well be the best one can do, but
it will nonetheless invite dispute and litigation.
97
95. Id. § 2B-102(a)(9).
96. Id. § 2B-102(a)(9).
97. Reporter's Note 4 to section 2B-110 ("Bizarre and oppressive terms") states that
"fu]nconscionability doctrine allows courts to monitor and limit application of [common
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Taken as a group, these four provisions constitute a significant weak-
ening of consumer protections in the electronic world. The Reporter's
Note is disingenuous when it claims that "[tihe limited approach adopted
here contrasts to non-uniform digital signature statutes enacted in several
states which replace or amend all signature and writing requirements, in-
cluding consumer statutes." 98 In fact, there appear to be no state digital
signature statutes which have any effect on consumer protection rules,
other than allowing an electronic record to substitute for a paper signa-
ture.99 It is technically true that the approach in Article 2B contrasts to the
prior practice of leaving consumer protection rules equally applicable to e-
commerce. The approach in Article 2B may or may not be correct, but it is
certainly not limited, and the difference is that Article 2B alters consumer
protections to the consumers' likely detriment.
Meanwhile, whether a CA gives an implied warranty of accuracy for
its CRL turns on whether the contents of the CRL are "published informa-
tional content" or mere "informational content." Article 2B defines "pub-
lished informational content" as "informational content prepared for or
made available to recipients generally or a class of recipients in substan-
tially the same form and not customized for a particular recipient by an
individual that is a licensor, or by an individual or group of individuals
acting on behalf of the licensor, using judgment or expertise."' 00 A CRL
fits that definition fairly well. However, the definition goes on to exclude
law principles] in a way that avoids binding the assenting party to unknown terms that are
bizarre and unfairly oppressive." Id. § 2B- 110, Reporter's Note 4. This seems to suggest
that unconscionability might be invoked to correct gross defects in the process of contract
formation, as well to correct grossly unfair contract terms, if electronic agents run wild. I
find this to be a very intriguing idea-but one that is absent from the text of section 2B-
110.
98. Id § 2B-105, Reporter's Note 6. No examples are offered-probably because
there are none. See infra note 99.
99. Other than stating the circumstances in which an electronic message may satisfy
a writing requirement, most of the state digital signature statutes to date, including the
influential Illinois statute, are silent on the subject of consumer protection. When they do
address the issue, they add, not subtract, protections for consumers. For example, the
Washington Electronic Authentication Act makes it clear that while agreements between
a CA and a subscriber may vary many of the provisions of the Authentication Act itself,
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to eliminate, modify, or condition any other
requirements for a contract to be valid, enforceable, and effective." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.34.320(2)(b) (1997). Additional consumer protections include forbidding a CA from
disclaiming or limiting warranties that a certificate has no known false information, and
that the certificate satisfies all material requirements of the statute. A CA is also required
to give a warranty that it has not exceeded limits of its license (e.g., the reliance limits).
Id § 19.34.220(1).
100. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(36) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
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"informational content provided in a special relationship of reliance be-
tween the provider and the recipient."' 10 1 It seems reasonable to say that a
CA has just such a special relationship with anyone who relies on its CRL.
The problem is that, in some models, anyone in the world may be able to
access the CRL and may have a need to do so. It is one thing to say that
the CA has a special relationship with its clients; without more guidance,
courts may be reluctant to impose a heightened duty on a CA that poten-
tially runs to the whole world. 0 2 The distinction is potentially significant
because under section 2B-404, there is no implied warranty of accuracy
for published information content,10 3 but there is such a warranty when a
special relationship of reliance exists. On the other hand, even if a CRL is
not published informational content, Article 2B allows a CA to disclaim
all warranties of accuracy for its CRL unless there is something in state
digital signature law to the contrary, or a court would find it unconscion-
able. 10
4
The potential impact of Article 2B, and the possible harm to the un-
lucky or unwary, becomes much greater when one considers the ways in
which Article 2B treats automated commerce. Article 2B contemplates
"automated transactions," defined as "contract[s] formed by electronic
means or electronic messages in which the actions or messages of one or
both parties will not be reviewed by an individual in the ordinary
course."'' 0 5 As a person is usually considered to intend and be responsible
for the ordinary and foreseeable results of her actions, codification of a
rule generally making people responsible for the acts of their electronic
agents' 0 6 changes little of substance, while usefully removing any doubts
that might exist about the validity of agent-based commerce. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that agent-based commerce is appropriate for
all types of transactions. In particular, given how little is known about how
agent-based commerce might work at the consumer level, if a state con-
sumer law rule requires conspicuousness, one might reasonably expect
that a uniform rule would say that those transactions cannot be consum-
mated without first actually securing some manifestation of approval by
the electronic agent's human principal. Instead, Article 2B removes any
101. Id.
102. See Froonkin, supra note 9.
103. See U.C.C. § 2B-404(b)(2) (Aug. i, 1998 Draft).
104. See id. §§ 2B-404 to 2B-406.
105. Id. § 2B-102(a)(4).
106. "'Electronic agent' means a computer program or other automated means used
by a person to independently initiate or respond to electronic messages or performances
on behalf of that person without review by an individual." Id. § 2B- 102(a)(l 9).
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need for human intervention, stating that a term is conspicuous "if it is
presented in a form that would enable a reasonably configured electronic
agent to take it into account or react without review of the record by an
individual."'10 7 Article 2B is more solicitous about the limited capacities of
agents than of people: if a person has reason to know he is dealing with an
electronic agent and proffers a contract term "to which the electronic agent
could not react" regardless of whether the person proffering the term knew
or could have known of the agent s limitations and regardless of whether
the agent was "reasonably configured, " then the term is not part of any
otherwise binding contract formed between the person and the agent.1
0 8
People with limited capacities to wade through contractual terms do not
get an equivalent solicitude.
In a world in which (Article 2B notwithstanding) some companies may
increasingly be releasing the source code of their programs into the public
domain so as to encourage third-party volunteer improvements, 1' the
danger of hacked copies of desirable programs will become more and
more significant. If some of these programs (e.g., web browsers enabled
for commerce) are hacked in a way that causes agents to ignore warnings
about critical terms or to engage in other rogue behavior undetectable by
the average user until well after the fact, the consequences for unlucky
consumers might be quite severe, especially if "[o]perations of an elec-
tronic agent constitute the authentication, manifestation of assent, or per-
formance of a person if the person used the electronic agent for such pur-
pose."' 10 If Bob acquires and uses an e-commerce enabled web browser
that unbeknownst to him has been hacked to order gifts for random strang-
ers and arrange direct e-mailed or shipping, did Bob use the rogue elec-
tronic agent "for the purpose" of making transactions? Yes. For the pur-
pose of making those transactions? No, since the transactions were not in-
tended. But under Article 2B, and perhaps under pre-Article 2B law as
well,"' Bob may be liable anyway.
107. Id § 2B-102(a)(9) (emphasis added).
108. See id. § 2B-204(3) ("The terms of a contract formed under paragraph (2) are
determined under Section 2B-207 or 2B-208 [relating to mass-market contracts], as ap-
plicable, but do not include terms provided by the individual in a manner to which the
electronic agent could not react.").
109. Cf Paul Phillips, Why Mozilla Matters (visited Nov. 9, 1998)
<http://www.mozilla.org/why-mozilla-matters.html>.
1 10. U.C.C. § 2B-i 19(a) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
S111. See also id. § 2B-1 10, Reporter's Note 4:
In some cases, however, automation may produce unexpected results
because of errors in program, problems in communication, technologi-
cal 'bugs', or other unforeseen circumstances. When this occurs,
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According to section 2B- 116, "an electronic authentication, message,
record, or performance is attributed to a person if... (2) the receiving per-
son, in accordance with a commercially reasonable attribution procedure
for identifying a person, reasonably concluded that it was the action of the
other person or the person's electronic agent.""11 2 In other words, if the
merchant correctly authenticated Bob's digital signature, as supplied by
the rogue agent, then in the absence of contrary agreement or regulations,
this "creates a presumption that the authentication, message, record or per-
formance" was Bob's. Even if Bob figures out what is going on, and suc-
cessfully rebuts the presumption that he wanted to send flowers to every
member of Congress, Bob is "nevertheless liable for losses of the other
party in the nature of reliance if the losses occur" if he failed to exercise
reasonable care. 113 It would be churlish to complain that the drafters do
not give any hint of what reasonable care might be since it is fairly clear
that no one currently has any idea.
Article 2B contemplates that e-commerce may go wrong and provides
a section, section 2B-118, that deals with "electronic error." This section
defines electronic error as "an error created by an information processing
system, by electronic transmission, or by a consumer using an electronic
system, if a means for correction or avoidance of such errors was not rea-
sonably provided." But section 2B- 118 is oddly quiet on who should have
reasonably provided a means of error-correction. Suppose Bob's hacked
browser orders 1,000 copies of Tetris when Bob is sleeping. Who has the
common law concepts of mistake apply, as do the provisions of Sec-
tion 2B- 118 ["electronic error"-see infra note 114 and accompanying
text]. In addition, unconscionability doctrine may be used to prevent
oppressive results caused by the breakdown in the contracting process.
While automated transactions are a new setting for this doctrine, the
safeguards it supplies are important for this type of commerce.
Id. §2B-110.
112. Id. §2B-116(a).
113. Id. § 2B-1 16(c). Other requirements, satisfied in the hypothetical in the text, are
that:
(2) the other party reasonably relied on the belief that the person was
the source of an electronic authentication, message, record, or per-
formance,
(3) the reliance resulted from acts of a third person that obtained access
numbers, codes, computer programs, or the like from a source under
the control of the person rebutting the presumption; and
(4) the use of the access numbers, codes, computer programs, or the
like created the appearance that it came from the person rebutting the
presumption.
Id. § 2B-1 16(c).
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burden of providing the means of correcting the error? Bob? The merchant
with whom Bob's malicious intelligent agent transacts? Or the original
manufacturer of Bob's browser? The Reporter's Note suggests that in this
hypothetical the merchant has the duty to send Bob a confirmatory e-
mail," '4 which sounds like a good start, although it would be more reas-
suring if the text of section 2B- 118 spelled that out clearly. In the absence
of electronic error-i.e. in the presence of the reasonable provision for
correction of error such as the confirmatory e-mail-Bob has no recourse
under section 2B- 118. Thus in the example above the merchant can de-
mand that Bob pay for the 1000 copies of Tetris even if Bob never read the
e-mail, or had reason to expect that he should be checking his e-mail, and
the copies were delivered to a third party without his knowledge. "
s
Even if there is the right sort of electronic error Bob escapes liability
under section 2B- 118 only in very limited circumstances:
(b) In an automated transaction consumer transaction, the con-
sumer is not bound by an electronic message that the consumer
did not intend and which was caused by an electronic error if the
consumer:
(1) promptly on the earlier of learning either of the error
or of the other party's reliance on the message:
114. The Reporter's Note to section 2B-118 offers two illustrations:
Illustration 1: Consumer intends to order ten copies of a video game
from Jones. In fact, the information processing system records 110.
The electronic agent maintaining Jones' site disburses I 10 copies. The
next morning, Consumer notices the mistake. He sends an E-Mail to
Jones describing the problem, offering to immediately return or de-
stroy copies; he does not use the games. Under this section, performing
on these offers means that there is no presumption that the contract
was for 110 copies. If it desires to enforce the apparent contract, Jones
must prove that there was no error.
Illustration 2: Same facts, except that Jones' system before shipping
sends a confirmation, asking Consumer to confirm that it ordered 110
games. Consumer confirms 110 copies. This section no longer applies.
If Consumer sees the confirmation request and does not respond, the
section also does not apply. In either case, the system reasonably al-
lowed for correction of the error.
Id § 2B-1 18, Reporter's Note.
115. See id. § 2B-120 ("an electronic message is effective when received even if no
individual is aware of its receipt. If an offer in an electronic message initiated by a person
or an electronic agent evokes an electronic message in response, a contract is formed: (1)
when an acceptance is received ... ").
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(A) in good faith notifies the other party of the
electronic error and that the consumer did not intend the
original message; and
(B) delivers all copies of any information it re-
ceives to the other party or delivers or destroys all copies
pursuant to any reasonable instructions received from
the other party; and
(2) has not used or received a benefit from the informa-
tion or informational rights or caused the information or benefit
to be made available to a third party." 
6
These conditions resemble what a court might reasonably conclude
under common law principles in a case with only two parties involved.
But what if Bob's rogue software was configured to forward the Tetris
software to one or more third parties without ever troubling Bob about the
matter? Perhaps section 2B-118(b)(2) could be modified to require that
Bob intentionally or knowingly have made the benefit available to an-
other?
E. Liability Rules
The issue of liability rules and presumptions is perhaps the most con-
troversial aspect of digital signature laws. 117 When digital signature laws
exist and speak to the question, they will trump the relevant portions of
Article 2B, although the interaction of Article 2B's choice of law princi-
ples and state digital signature laws may create some confusion. When a
state does not have a digital signature statute, or has a statute that does not
address liability issues, Article 2B's provisions will control.
Article 2B sets up a liability regime by which a person who uses a se-
cure electronic authentication procedure, such as a digital signature, and
then negligently loses control of that digital signature, is liable for all
losses in the nature of reliance in transactions to which Article 2B applies
that are caused by that negligence. If Bob, not fully understanding the im-
plications or use of new technology, allows Alice to obtain access to Bob's
computer, other device, PIN, or passphrase that will allow Alice to use
Bob's digital signature, then, according to section 2B- 116, Bob is respon-
sible for paying the reliance costs caused by Alice's subsequent spending
116.Id. §2B-118.
117. For a summary of the issues see C. Bradford Biddle, Misplaced Priorities: The
Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1143 (1996).
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spree. 1 8 Bob's proof that it was really Alice is of no use if the merchant
reasonably relied at the time of sale, and in most cases it will be reason-
able to rely on a digital signature backed by a valid certificate. As there is
no equivalent to a credit limit in digital signature-based commerce, the
liabilities that Alice could impose on Bob in seconds, perhaps with the aid
of an electronic agent or two, is theoretically unlimited.
"Non-repudiation," that is, Bob's inability to escape from having to
compensate parties who reasonably relied on Alice's claim that she was
Bob, is one of the top items on the legislative agenda of those who hope to
have digitally signed electronic purchasing replace credit and debit card
transactions. Armed with a guarantee of non-repudiation, CAs should be
able offer a transaction mechanism with much lower overheads than credit
cards since the trusted third party would no longer function as a sort of
insurer of the validity of the transaction-the law would. Non-repudiation
contrasts dramatically with consumer habits and expectations engendered
by credit cards, although the customer's ability to unwind transactions that
use debit cards depends more on bank practices than law." 
9
Most states that have considered the issue have rejected the strong
form of non-repudiation included in Article 2B. The specter of "grandma
losing her house because she lost control of her digital signature" has sim-
ply proved too frightening. 120 Rejected proposals leave their traces, if any,
in legislative history, not the statute books. Thus, although many states
concluded that they did not wish to enact non-repudiation rules placing
most or all potential liabilities on parties other than CAs, the nature of the
legislative process ensures that these decisions to reject or defer the issue
are not memorialized in law. It follows that were Article 2B's liability
rules to be enacted, they would take effect even all states that do not have
explicit contrary rules in their digital signature laws, even if they consid-
ered and rejected the idea.' 21
There are some sound policy arguments in favor of non-repudiation in
e-commerce, such as when the transacting parties are both sophisticated,
or the electronic transactions are sufficiently unusual that all parties under-
118. Recall that, under U.C.C. § 2B-1 16, "an electronic authentication, message, re-
cord, or performance is attributed to a person if ... (2) the receiving person, in accordance
with a commercially reasonable attribution procedure for identifying a person, reasonably
concluded that it was the action of the other person."
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (1995) (limiting liability to $
50 for most unauthorized electronic funds transfers).
120. For what it's worth, I believe I originated this now-widespread meme in 1995,
in my participation on the ABA Digital Signature Guidelines drafting process.
121. Recall that section 2B-105(g) grandfathers digital signature statutes.
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stand that the technology is not used casually. My personal view happens
to be that the case for-non;repudiation of digital signature-based consumer
transactions remains to be proved. Whether I am correct about that or not,
a very significant amount of public debate and consumer education would
be required before imposing potentially unlimited ability on the Bob's of
the world, or on parents or grandparents of any gender. Perhaps that case
could be made. It has not been made in Article 2B, and a statute about the
rules appropriate for licenses relating to ever-shrinking types of intellec-
tual property 122 is an inappropriate vehicle for such sweeping changes in
electronic transactions law generally. Article 2B's adoption of strong non-
repudiation contrasts with the revised draft UETA. Where once UETA in-
cluded presumptions that Bob would have had to rebut, now the draft. is




The Reporter's comment that "Article 2B will have little impact on
established commercial practice" because "[e]ven with a broad scope ...
most provisions can be altered by agreement and defer to customs of trade,
course of dealing, or formal contracts' 124 seems somewhat optimistic
when applied to e-commerce, since so often there are no customs or
usages of trade to fall back on.
122. The Recording Industry Association of America, the National Association of
Broadcasters, the National Cable Television Association, the Newspaper Association of
America, the Magazine Publishers of America, and the Motion Picture Association of
America have each expressed opposition to Article 2B or asked that their industry be
excluded from it. See, e.g., Letter from Cary H. Sherman, Senior Executive Vice Presi-
dent and General Counsel, Recording Industry Association of America to National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Oct. 9, 1998) (expressing opposition
and noting similar views of other trade associations), available at
<http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/riaal098.html>. See also infra note 128 (noting sugges-
tion by Director of ALl and other influential lawyers that scope of Article 2B should be
limited).
123. The current draft's language is in flux, but reads "[a]n electronic record is at-
tributable to a person if ... [an] other person, in good faith and acting in compliance con-
formity with a commercially reasonable security procedure for identifying the person to
which the electronic record is sought to be attributed, reasonably concluded that it was
the act of the other person, a person authorized by it, or the person's electronic agent."
UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 202 (Sept. 18, 1998 Draft), available at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecicta/eta1098.htm>.Even when a record created
by Alice is "attributable" to Bob, it has only "the effect provided for by the agreement
regarding the security procedure." Id.
124. U.C.C. § 2B-104, Reporter's Note 1 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
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For a legislature to pass Article 2B in its current form would be akin to
installing a beta version of a large and complex operating system. Modem
operating systems and software suites often attempt to occupy the field
and provide an array of extensive, complex, and often poorly documented
or understood features.' 25 Some parts of the package may have strange in-
teractions with software already installed on the system while other parts
may assume the existence of hardware or software that is still in develop-
ment (e.g., the reasonably configured electronic agent). Article 2B's
enormously ambitious strategy of providing a full regime for the sale and
delivery of licenses in information resembles one of these self-installing
software suites. While some of the rules regarding electronic contracting
may be defensible, or even sensible, the total package makes a series of
policy choices, especially those displacing consumer law for online trans-
actions and enacting a national law on non-repudiation for digital signa-
ture-based e-commerce which do not seem to be required to achieve the
end of rationalizing the law of information licenses.
As an abstract proposition, Article 2B represents a praiseworthy at-
tempt to identify problems and solve them early. It is surely correct that
"[t]ypically, U.S. law is drafted in retrospect. Years of informal standards
are developed and then codified. Article 2B is an attempt to get ahead of
that curve."1 26 There is a strong case to be made for writing uniform laws
that will achieve the "optimal impact for the modernization themes devel-
oped with reference to electronic commerce." That case does not appear
very clearly from Article 2B, nor does it appear that Article 2B's vision of
what optimization looks like is necessarily the one that legislatures and the
public would or should share. Whether or not Article 2B embodies the
best vision of online contracting rules, it seems distinctly sub-optimal to
adopt a special set of online contracting rules that would apply only to li-
censes in information (whether or not part of a larger sale), or only to
mixed transactions in which the information license component was suffi-
ciently great. Today at least, the look and feel of online shopping is much
the same whether the thing being purchased is a CD-Rom with a program
on it, a book, or computer part. If uniform laws are to be written for e-
commerce, they should cover all of it, not perpetuate the patchwork we
already have by overwriting new cleavages onto an already fractured law.
125. See Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Aggregation and Disaggragation of
Information Goods: Implications of Bundling, Site Licensing and Micropayment (visited
Oct. 24, 1998) <http://www.stern.nyu.edu/-bakos/aig.pdf'>.
126. Letter from Terrence Maher, to Editor, San Francisco Chronicle, (June 17,
1998), available at <http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/tmaherrre.html> (visited Nov. 23,
1998).
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And when those uniform rules are written, they must take due account of
consumer law's considered mix of paternalistic rules and the correction of
market failures created by information asymmetries, as well as taking ac-
count of consumer expectations and usages of trade.
Here, Article 2B says it well:
[Quoting Grant Gilmore:]
The principal objects of draftsmen of general commer-
cial legislation ... are to be accurate and not to be origi-
nal. Their intention is to assure that if a given transaction
... is initiated, it shall have a specified result; they at-
tempt to state as a matter of law the conclusion which
the business community apart from statute ... gives to
the transaction in any case. But achievement of those
modest goals is a task of considerable difficulty.
To be accurate and not original refers to commercial practice as
an appropriate standard for gauging appropriate contract law
unless a clear countervailing policy indicates to the contrary or
the contractual arrangement threatens injury to third-party inter-
ests which social policy desires to protect. Uniform contract laws
do not regulate practice. They sustain and facilitate it. The bene-
fits of codification lie in defining principles consistent with
commercial practice which can be relied on and are readily dis-
cernible and understandable to commercial parties.127
Despite some improvements in the most recent drafts, as regards its e-
commerce rules Article 2B does not meet the high standard it rightly sets
for itself. 121
127. U.C.C. Art. 2B, Default Rules (quoting Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of
Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L. J. 1341 (1957)).
128. On October 7, the Director of the ALl joined in a letter requesting substantial
changes to Article 2B, including narrowing the scope to apply only to information subject
to "informational right" as defined in section 102(a)(27) and the removal of all sections
relating to contract formation by electronic means. See Memorandum from Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. et al. on July 1998 Draft Suggested Changes to Article 2B Drafting Commit-
tee (Oct. 7, 1998) available at <http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/gch1098.pdf> (visited
Nov. 23, 1998). This is a very encouraging development.
[Vol. 13:10231062
